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Transparency and Stock Price Volatility: European Evidence 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the key determinants of the information transparency and its 
consequences for the market, namely in what concerns the stock price volatility, analysing 
the disclosure practices of two European countries. A transparency and a volatility model 
are applied. Based on annual reports information, we could not find any significant 
relationship between transparency and volatility. However, considering the quarterly 
reports, we find a negative relation between these variables for the second quarter, 
suggesting that the higher the transparency, the lower the stock price volatility. This 
research contributes to the recent literature on the information transparency and stock price 
volatility, analysing two small European countries that are clearly in need of research. 
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1. Introduction 
In a society depending on real time information, corporate disclosure is crucial for the 
capital market efficiency. The more disclosures a company makes, the more transparent 
becomes the information to investors and more credible the firms will be for the market, 
resulting in a stock price increase.  
In this context, we decide to analyse the disclosure situation of Portuguese listed firms. The 
study finds that transparency is influenced by some firm-specific variables, suggesting that 
firms which present higher levels of transparency tend to be the ones of larger size and 
higher profitability. Based on annual reports information, our evidence does not support 
the hypothesis of a relationship between transparency and volatility. However, considering 
the quarterly reports, we find a negative and significant relation between these variables for 
the second quarter, suggesting that the higher the transparency, the lower the stock price 
volatility. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes literature. Section three 
describes the methodology and the data. Section four reports the empirical results and 
section five concludes the paper.   
2. Previous Literature 
Transparency generates benefits not only for the companies, but also for the global 
economy. Foreign direct investment increases with the corporate transparency (Razin and 
Sadka, 2007, among others).  
Transparency is also a means of reducing the cost of capital and increasing the market 
liquidity (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Several authors found a negative relationship between 
the cost of capital and the level of disclosure (Clarkson et al., 1996; Armitage and Marston, 
2008) and a positive relation between market liquidity and the level of disclosure 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Botosan and Plumlee (2002) found evidence of lower 
equity and debt costs in firms with higher levels of disclosure.  
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There are evidence of a negative relationship between the level of information asymmetry 
and the market efficiency (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Verrecchia, 2001; Zhang, 
2001).  
Furthermore, some studies found a negative relationship between firm disclosure and price 
volatility, such as Lee and Chung (1998), Bushee and Noe (2000) and Baumann and Nier 
(2004). Alves and Santos (2008) find evidence that the first and third quarters information 
is significantly related with price volatility and trading volume, suggesting informativeness 
of financial reporting.  
Ding et al. (2008) analyse the transparency of 63 firms of Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, and compared them with 58 firms from Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden), using two proxies of financial transparency. The main conclusion achieved is 
that Baltic countries have a lower level of financial transparency than the Nordic ones. The 
authors found a negative relationship between transparency and volatility for both 
measures in the Nordic countries, and for one of the measures in the Baltic sample. Thus, 
the authors conclude that Baltic investors are only interested in financial information, 
whereas in Nordic countries, investors give also importance of information towards 
governance and ownership. 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) concludes that the change in prices are associated with 
the variance of the underlying cash flows, the quality of the first information released, and 
the inter-temporal and cross-sectional correlation in information noise.  
Previous studies find a negative relationship between disclosure and ownership 
concentration (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Laidroo, 2009, among others), concluding that 
the demand for ownership structure generates the need of quality accounting information. 
3. Methodology and Data 
In order to analyse the phenomenon of information transparency, we start to choose the 
proxies to measure transparency. After, we consider a transparency and a volatility model.  
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Disclosure indices 
The relation between transparency indices and disclosure is documented by Singhvi and 
Desai (1971) and Lang and Lundholm (1993).  
We decide to consider two indices extensively used in prior studies to measure 
transparency: Center for International Financial Analysis & Research (CIFAR) and the 
Standard & Poor’s (2002) Transparency & Disclosure index (S&P). The CIFAR measure 
is related with specific types of accounting policies, including items from the income and 
cash flow statements, as well as balance sheet. The S&P includes items associated with 
voluntary types of disclosure, such as information about the ownership structure and 
governance1. The total points2 obtained by a specific firm are computed, for the two 
indices, by the following formulas:  
,	 =	∑ 	

                                                     [1] 
,	 = ∑ &	

                     [2] 
The sums of SCOREci,j, measuring CIFAR, and SCOREsepi,j, measuring S&P, go through 
the total number of points awarded to the firm j for all the questions i, with i = 1...78 for 
CIFAR and i = 1...96 for S&P index.  
Transparency Model 
According prior literature, financial disclosure is related to several firm-specific variables, 
such as the size of the firm, profitability, their auditors rating, equity offer, leverage and 
the number of analysts following the company. Consequently, we estimate the following 
ordinary least square (OLS) model: 
 =  ! +  #$%&' +  ()* +  +,-& +  .#/)$0)')$ +
 1%2)$# +  3%)$	// +  4ℎ) + 6     [3] 
where: 
                                                           
1
 For space management reasons, the list of discretionary items considered in the CIFAR and S&P indices is 
not reported, but available from authors upon request. 
2
 The measures are dichotomous: we attribute the value of 1 if the information is disclosed in the firm’s 
Annual Reports, the value of 0 if the information is not provided, and we exclude the item if the disclosure of 
information is irrelevant and is not provided.  
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Transparency = disclosure score based on one of two indices; 
Portugal = dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is 
Portuguese (PT) and zero otherwise; 
Size = logarithm of total assets; 
Leverage = ratio of total debt over total assets; 
Profitability = return on equity (ROE) of the firm, computed as the income before 
extraordinary items divided by book value of equity, relative to the  
ROE of the industry; 
Auditor = dummy variable that take the value one if the company is audited 
by a Big 4 firm and zero otherwise; 
Equity Offer = dummy variable that take the value one if the company arranged 
an equity offer during 2008, and zero otherwise; 
Ownership = voting rights of the three biggest shareholders of the company; 
6 = Error term. 
We expect a positive relationship between firm size and the release of information, like the 
results of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Hope (2003) and between the disclosure level 
and the firms profitability, such as Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Armitage and Marston 
(2008). 
The results concerning the relationship between information disclosure and the firm 
leverage are not consensual. Thus, the signal of the leverage variable is ambiguous. 
The audits indicator is a measure of the reliability of financial accounting disclosures 
(Bushman et al., 2004). Consequently, we expect that the better the quality of audits, the 
higher the transparency of the firm. Following previous studies, we use the “Big 4” proxy 
to measure the audit quality.  
The literature suggests that firms with equity offers have more incentive to disclose 
information than the firms without them (Lang and Lundholm, 1997). 
We include the ownership variable because we expect it might be relevant to explain 
transparency.  
Volatility Model 
In what concerns the volatility, we examine whether transparency and stock price volatility 
are related with each other. The volatility model is formulated as follows:  
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where: 
Volatility = standard deviation of share prices calculated from end-of-week share 
prices; 
MB = end-of-the-year capitalization divided by book value of total common 
equity; 
DYield = dividend yield , computed as dividend per share divided by year-end 
stock price; 
IndFeffects = fixed effects for eight industry sectors; 
6 = Error term. 
Stock price volatility is influenced by the market-to-book ratio (MB), used as a proxy for 
growth predictions, which is associated with higher future volatility (Fama and French, 
1992; La Porta et al., 1997; Berkman et al., 2002). The expected signal for this coefficient 
is positive.  
We expected a negative sign the Dividend Yield variable, such as the results of Allen and 
Rachim (1996). 
The Sample 
In order to analyse the transparency of the Portuguese market, we use a sample of non-
financial listed firms on the Euronext Lisbon (EL). We exclude financial firms because 
those companies should obey to strict legal requirements regarding their finance. The data 
was collected on the 2008 annual reports, from the firm’s websites3. The Portuguese final 
sample consists of 45 firms (of the 56 listed on EL).  
The Portuguese sample is matched with a Belgium sample, considering the matching 
method. After removing the firms simultaneously listed on other stock Exchanges, the 
sample was grouped according the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industry. 
Finally, it is obtained the Belgian matched sample, according the size of the companies. 
Four of the Belgian firms were used twice as a matching pair for some of the Portuguese 
                                                           
3
 When some kind of information was not found, we obtain the data from the website of the Portuguese 
committee of the securities market (CMVM). 
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firms because of the lack of Belgian companies, namely in what concerns the industry and 
size criteria.  
4. Empirical results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the disclosure indices for the Portuguese and 
the Belgium samples. 
For Portugal, the CIFAR index mean is 56.2, whereas for Belgium it presents a value of 
54.5. In what concerns the S&P index, the higher mean is for Belgium, with a score of 58, 
whereas the Portuguese mean score is of 57.5. In what concerns the maximum values, we 
can see that, for the CIFAR index, the most transparent firm are from Portugal, but 
concerning S&P index the better score comes from a Belgium company. Consequently, we 
conclude that Portuguese firms are more focuses on the spread of their accounting policies 
and Belgium firms are more concerned with the policies of ownership and governance. 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between CIFAR and S&P indices for 
the Portuguese and Belgium markets. For both countries, the correlation between the two 
indices is of about 43%, significant at 1% level. The results of relatively high correlation 
(approximately 49%) between the transparency indices, and statically significant for 
Portugal, is a sign that transparency is explained by these factors. For the Belgium stock 
market, the result is lower (38% approximately), what could be a concern.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Portuguese and 
Belgium firms’ size are quite similar, being the size mean of 8.61 and 8.49, respectively. 
However, Portuguese firms have more leverage than the Belgian ones. 
In what concerns the profitability, and considering the two markets together, the 
profitability is negative, with a significant number of companies presenting a negative 
value for the earnings before extraordinary items. Indeed, 2008 was a year characterised by 
a financial and economy crisis. Considering the two samples separately, Portuguese firms 
seem to be more profitable than the Belgium ones. 
The Belgian sample has a higher percentage of firms audited by one of the BIG 4 (77.78%) 
than the Portuguese sample (73.33%). Furthermore, equity offer was an absent and rare 
event, respective by the Portuguese and the Belgium sample (2%). 
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Finally, both Portuguese and Belgian firms present a high level of ownership concentration 
with a Belgian mean of 60.3% and a Portuguese mean of 64%. 
Comparing these results with the ones of Ding et al. (2008), it is observed that, globally, 
both the Baltic and the Nordic firms’ present higher size, have lower leverage, higher 
profitability, higher percentage of auditors from BIG 4, and similar number of equity 
offers. The exception is the fact that Nordic firms have a lower level of ownership 
concentration, around 47.68%. 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the transparency indices, the 
Portuguese coefficient and the control variables. For variables that are significantly 
correlated, the coefficients are not very high (always below 50%), so it does not appear to 
be sufficiently large to cause concern about multicollinearity problems.  
Table 5 reports the results of the OLS regression models, analysing the relation between 
disclosure levels and the firm-specific variables, in order to study the information 
transparency. We correct for heteroscedasticity, applying the White (1980) method.  
The coefficients that explain transparency, considering both the CIFAR and the S&P 
indices are the firm SIZE, PROFITABILITY and EQUITY OFFER, all of them with the 
expected signal (positive), except the EQUITY OFFER, in the S&P case, such as like Ding 
et al. (2008). Regarding the SIZE of the firm, bigger firms have better scores of 
transparency. About the PROFITABILITY, although it is not economically significant, the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Globally, these results suggest that firms that present higher level of transparency tend to 
be ones of larger size, higher profitability and with equity offers events, which is consistent 
with the results of Singhvi and Desai (1971), Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), Branco and 
Rodrigues (2008), Ding et al. (2008) and Cho et al. (2010).  
The PT dummy is positive for CIFAR index and negative for S&P index, suggesting that 
Portuguese firms are more transparent than the Belgian ones in the accounting policies 
(CIFAR) and that the Belgian firms have a higher level of transparency than the 
Portuguese ones in what concerns the ownership and the governance features (S&P). Ding 
et al. (2008) find evidence that Baltic firms are less transparent then the Nordic ones, 
concerning the subjects of ownership and governance (S&P index).  
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In order to analyse the relationship between stock price volatility and the disclosure 
(TRANSPARENCY), we run model [4]. Table 6 shows the results for the Portuguese 
(Panel A) and the Belgian (Panel B) samples. The models consider the industry fixed 
effects that control the volatility changes due to the type of industry.  
For the Portuguese sample, the only variable that contributes to explain the stock price 
volatility is the SIZE, in a positive way, being the results consistent with the ones of Fama 
and French (1992), Allen and Rachim (1996), Baumann and Nier (2004) and Ding et al. 
(2008), for the Nordic sample. The non significant coefficient leads to the conclusion that 
in Portugal the stock prices volatility is not influenced by the transparency of the company, 
i.e., the level of disclosure, in the annual reports, observed by the investors. 
In what concerns the Belgium sample, we can see that none of the coefficient presents a 
statistically significant value, thus, individually, none of these variables can explain the 
stock price volatility. 
Overall, the results do not give support for the hypothesis that transparency scores are 
negative associated with the stock prices volatility, contrary to the results of Ding et al. 
(2008), but only for the S&P index.  
For robustness reasons, we increase the frequency of disclosure, using information of 
quarterly reports and we find evidence of a negative relation between transparency and 
volatility for the second quarter, suggesting that the higher the transparency, the lower the 
stock price volatility4. 
5. Conclusion 
This study provides empirical evidence on the determinants of information disclosure and 
the effects of disclosure on stock price volatility for Portuguese and Belgian stock markets. 
The transparency was measured by two indices: the CIFAR and the S&P. The results 
suggest that Portuguese firms are more concern about disclosure from the regulation of 
accounting and Belgian firms are more transparent in terms of ownership structure.  
                                                           
4
 For space reasons, the results are not reported, but available from authors upon request. 
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We find a significant relationship between disclosure and firm SIZE, PROFITABILITY 
and EQUITY OFFER, which is in agreement with the ones of Lang and Lundholm (1997), 
Healy et al. (1999), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Ding et al. (2008), among others. 
When we analyse the relationship between transparency and the stock price volatility, we 
find no statistical significance between the two transparency measures and volatility. For 
the Portuguese sample, only the firm SIZE seems to be significantly related with the 
volatility, suggesting that stock prices volatility increases with the size of the companies. 
Analysing the quarterly announcements, we find evidence of a negative relationship 
between transparency and the stock price volatility for the second quarter, suggesting that 
this release of information is quite important for investors. This result is in agreement with 
the ones of Lee and Chung (1998), Bushee and Noe (2000) and Baumann and Nier (2004).  
In a further research, we would like to explore a more scrutinized index to measure the 
transparency, as well as consider the separation between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for disclosure indices 
 
 
PORTUGAL BELGIUM 
CIFAR S&P CIFAR S&P 
 Mean 56.2 57.5 54.5 58 
 Median 57 59 56 58 
 Maximum 66 73 62 79 
 Minimum 39 28 41 40 
 Std. Dev. 5.7 9.5 5.5 8.2 
Q1 54 54 52 54 
Q3 59 65 58 61 
 
t-test for equality of means 
 
   
t  Sig (2-tailed)  
CIFAR (Portugal and Belgium) 1.988 * 0.053  
S&P (Portugal and Belgium) 0.534  0.596  
 
*  Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 2  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between CIFAR and S&P based indices 
 
Countries N Correlation  
Both Portuguese and Belgium countries 90 0.4270 *** 
Portugal 45 0.4888 *** 
Belgium 45 0.3769 *** 
 
 ***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for independent variables 
 
  
Variable 
BELGIUM AND 
PORTUGAL PORTUGAL BELGIUM 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
SIZE 8.5482 0.7425 8.6081 0.7321 8.4883 0.7562 
LEVERAGE 0.6049 0.6735 0.7419 0.8995 0.4680 0.2647 
PROFITABILITY -27.5797 278.3622 1.1852 8.6101 -56.3446 393.6566 
AUDITOR 0.7556 0.4322 0.7333 0.4472 0.7778 0.4204 
EQUITY OFFER 0.0111 0.1054 0 0 0.0222 0.1491 
OWNERSHIP 0.6216 0.2125 0.6401 0.2035 0.6030 0.2219 
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Table 4 
Correlation Coefficients of variables for both countries together 
 
 ***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
 **  Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
 *   Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
 
 
  
  CIFAR S&P PT SIZE LEVERAGE PROFITABILTY AUDITOR 
EQUITY 
OFFER 
PT 0.1329 -0.0195 
SIZE 0.3166*** 0.3811*** -0.0213 
LEVERAGE 0.0579 -0.0610 0.1619 0.1308 
PROFITABILITY 0.0757 0.0788 0.0971 -0.1413 -0.0209 
AUDITOR 0.2327** 0.2921*** -0.0380 0.4183*** -0.1376 -0.0543 
EQUITY OFFER 0.1255 -0.0215 -0.0992 0.1928* 0.0162 0.0127 0.0603 
OWNERSHIP -0.0773 -0.0219 0.1287 -0.1079 0.0174 0.2401** -0.0846 0.1643 
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Table 5 
Regression Results - Determinants of disclosure levels 
 
 
  
Variables 
  
CIFAR S&P 
Coef. Sig.  Coef.   Sig. 
Intercept 38.6337 *** 0.0000  17.9955   0.1082 
PT 1.6990 0.1447  -0.3343   0.1082 
SIZE 1.9081 ** 0.0229  4.4684 ***  0.0014 
LEVERAGE 0.1784 0.8181  -1.0982   0.5765 
PROFITABILITY 0.0026 *** 0.0000  0.0043 ***  0.0000 
AUDITOR 1.6792 0.2203  2.8179   0.2457 
EQUITY OFFER 5.3569 *** 0.0013  -9.0155 ***  0.0003 
OWNERSHIP -2.8278 0.2204  0.7979   0.8416 
Adjusted R2   0.0894  0.1336 
N   90  90 
  
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 6 
Regression results – Effect of disclosure on stock price volatility 
 
Panel A: Stock price volatility regressed on disclosure metric and control variable for Portugal 
 
Variables 
CIFAR S&P 
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
Intercept        -7.6632*** 0.0044      -7.8163*** 0.0016 
TRANSPARENCY -0.0040 0.8906 0.0009 0.9687 
SIZE        1.0716*** 0.0003     1.0568*** 0.0010 
LEVERAGE 0.1049 0.5550 0.1132 0.5566 
PROFITABILITY 0.0587 0.5437 0.0125 0.4837 
MB 0.0587 0.2965 0.0571 0.3024 
DIVIDEND YIELD -8.9523 0.2333 -9.0057 0.2310 
Adjusted R2 0.2726 0.2721 
N 45 45 
Panel B: Stock price volatility regressed on disclosure metric and control variable for Belgium 
Variables 
CIFAR S&P 
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
Intercept 13.6295 0.7600 -9.1703 0.8142 
TRANSPARENCY -0.6641 0.1815 -0.4755 0.1691 
SIZE 1.8587 0.6727 3.4848 0.4559 
LEVERAGE 11.7928 0.3275 5.3431 0.6463 
PROFITABILITY 0.0267 0.4152 0.0250 0.4406 
MB 0.0319 0.4792 0.0289 0.5175 
DIVIDEND YIELD 53.4223 0.1161 64.7040 0.5557 
Adjusted R2 0.7858 0.7865 
N 45 45 
 
Industry Fixed effects included in the models 
***  Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
  
